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ÒDostoyevsky was concerned with 
psychology; he made visible the criminal 
element hidden in each person. Brecht is 
concerned with politics; he makes visible the 






I. Between Psyche and Polis 
The Act of Killing (2012) resists clear categorization as a cultural artefact. 
Neither documentary nor dramatization, it inhabits a space between, offering a 
novel approach to cinematic representations of historical violence. Referencing 
the period surrounding the overthrow of Indonesian president Sukarno by a 
military coup in the mid-1960s that brought US-backed General Suharto to 
power, the film focuses on several mid-level agents of an anti-communist purge 
that resulted in the deaths of half a million to two million people.
2
 By following 
a group of former paramilitary killers through dramatic re-enactments of their 
crimes, it lends material resources and an international platform to the 
                                                
1
 Walter Benjamin, ÒBrechtÕs Threepenny Novel,Ó in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, 
Autobiographical Writings (New York: Schocken Books, 1978), 201. 
2
 The figure here is the filmmakerÕs own, drawn from a co-authored introduction to an edited 
volume. See Joram ten Brink and Joshua Oppenheimer (eds.), Killer Images: Documentary 
Film, Memory and the Performance of Violence (New York: Wallflower Press/Columbia 
University Press, 2012). For the broader history of the period, see Ariel Heryanto, State 
Terrorism and Political Identity in Indonesia: Fatally Belonging (New York: Routledge, 2006); 
John Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and SuhartoÕs Coup 
dÕtat in Indonesia (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006); and Max Lane, 
Catastrophe in Indonesia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press/Seagull Books, 2010); see also 
Robert Cribb, ÒThe Indonesian Massacres,Ó in Samuel Totten and William S. Parsons (eds.), 
Century of Genocide, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2008), 235Ð262. 
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perpetrators through inviting them to produce their own narrative of the 
violence using the stylistic conventions of their choice. 
In contemporary Indonesia, where many of the same perpetrators have 
links to state power and are treated as heroic figures, the discourse of Òending 
impunityÓ invoked by human rights activists and proponents of international 
criminal law is markedly absent. As one of the filmÕs subjects maintains, Òwar 
crimes are defined by the winners. IÕm a winner. So I can make my own 
definition.Ó Institutional mechanisms such as courts and truth commissions that 
inscribe and enforce the redress of past wrongs are far from the political 
horizon in contemporary Indonesia. Coming to terms with past atrocities 
requires alternate approaches in a polity that continues to disavow this violent 
history. In this sense the film is an intervention: a possible unsettling of 
political complacency and a site for reflection on existing power structures and 
historical effacements. The filmÕs official trailer prompts its audience with the 
overlaid textÑÒwhy have they never been punished?ÓÑsuggesting that lack of 
accountability is a significant and framing theme. 
By inviting perpetrators to craft narratives of their crimes, however, The 
Act of Killing also provokes reflection on its novel experimental form. The film 
draws its audience into a space of ethical ambiguity, prompting questions as to 
the workÕs meaning and purpose. Can it produce remorse and redemption 
among its perpetrator-subjects, and is this approach likely to bring about 
political transformation? How might this artefact contribute to the historical 
record of mass atrocity? The Act of Killing can thus be read in relation to 
Òtransitology,Ó a term that I use here to characterize the ideological 
underpinnings, sentiments, and themes of the field of transitional justice.
3
 The 
field places ideological emphasis on the temporal and ethical movement from 
past injustice to a presumptively just present. As part of a broader discourse of 
Òhumanitarian reason,Ó
4
 it employs affective sentiments that include trauma, 
                                                
3
 ÒTransitologyÓ is often understood more narrowly as referring to the comparative political 
study of regime transitions, and particularly of post-Soviet regimes, within the discipline of 
political science. For a critical treatment of this narrower form, see John Haskell and Boris 
Mamlyuk, ÒCapitalism, Communism É and Colonialism? Revisiting ÔTransitologyÕ as the 
Ideology of Informal Empire,Ó Global Jurist 9, no. 2 (2009): 1Ð35. Others have used the term in 
relation to transitional justice; see John Torpey (ed.), Politics and the Past: On Repairing 
Historical Injustices (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003). Here I use the 
term to refer to the animating sentiments of the field of transitional justiceÑthus its referent is 
more an affect than a field of inquiry or a set of mechanisms.  
4
 Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present, trans. Rachel Gomme 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012). Fassin argues that Òhumanitarianism elicits the 
fantasy of a global moral community that may still be viable and the expectation that solidarity 
may have redeeming powers. This secular imaginary of communion and redemption implies a 
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healing, remorse, and redemption. It addresses themes of accountability, 
impunity, truth-telling, and reconciliation. These sentiments and themes have 
appeared within the film itself, in interviews with its makers, and in journalistic 
and scholarly commentary. According to an anthropologist specializing in 
cultural and political responses to IndonesiaÕs violent past, the film Òpenetrates 
the entrenched impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators of one of the worst 
massacres in modern history.Ó
5
 In this light, the film has been taken up not only 
as a creative work, but also as a means of provoking a psychological transition 
in its subjects and a broader political recognition of a disavowed past. 
The Act of Killing can be read in relation to what I am calling 
ÒtransitologyÓ on two different registers: at the level of the psyche and at the 
level of the polis. Following Walter Benjamin, we might say that the film 
combines a Dostoyevskian interest in the inner criminal with a Brechtian 
concern for exposing the underside of political and social structuresÑin this 
case, the links between individual killers, paramilitary organizations, and 
ultimately the Indonesian state. Joshua Oppenheimer, the most public presence 
of the filmÕs three directors, offers an account of his decision to support a group 
of perpetrators, including the filmÕs main perpetrator-protagonist, Anwar 
Congo, in producing narratives of their own crimes: 
And so begins a process of refinement and embellishment where 
these simple re-enactments with Anwar and his friends become 
these kind of grotesque, surreal, beautiful, phantasmagoric 
dramatizations. The engine of that embellishment is in fact 
AnwarÕs own conscience in the hope that by making it beautiful 
in the film he can somehow make it ok for himself.
6
 
Oppenheimer is interested in tracing the work of AnwarÕs conscienceÑto the 
extent that he believes he can record and render it visibleÑin order to show 
how Anwar tries to Òmake it okÓ for himself. AnwarÕs psyche provides a key 
narrative thread for the film, which at times seems to venture into a personal 
journey of seeking redemption, or, at the very least, of some form of release 
                                                                                                                             
sudden awareness of the fundamentally unequal human condition and an ethical necessity to not 
remain passive about it in the name of solidarityÑhowever ephemeral this awareness is, and 
whatever limited impact this necessity hasÓ (xii). 
5
 Ariel Heryanto, ÒThe 1965Ð6 Killings: Facts and Fictions in Dangerous Liaisons,Ó 




 SOHK.TV Interview with Joshua Oppenheimer (The Act of Killing), interview by Jack Jones, 
© Minky Productions 2013, available online at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pMBx4crMG7A. 
MediaTropes Vol VI, No 2 (2016)  Sara Kendall / 23 
www.mediatropes.com 
from the nightmares that have been haunting him. Yet Oppenheimer claims an 
additional objective: he wants to show that this violence in which Anwar is 
implicated is not removed, remote, and marginal, but rather endemic and 
universal. ÒAll of our societies are built on mass violence,Ó he contends, which 
forms the Òthe underbelly of our reality.Ó
7
 In the words of Simon Critchley, we 
might say that the wider orientation of The Act of Killing is one of Òpolitical 
disappointmentÓ: 
something lacking or failing arises from the realization that we 
inhabit a violently unjust world, a world defined by the horror of 
war, a world where, as Dostoevsky says, blood is being spilt in 
the merriest way, as if it were champagne.
8
 
Part of the filmÕs project entails capturing the merry ways in which its subjects 
recount the spilling of blood. For Critchley, political disappointment Òprovokes 
the question of justice,Ó
9
 and it seems that the question of justice haunts the 
margins of the film without being overtly addressed. How then can this 
Òviolently unjust worldÓ be navigated, where perpetrators such as Congo 
continue to inhabit positions of influence? What kind of transition, if any, is 
possible without a transformation of the polisÑthe political community that has 
been affected by mass atrocity? Is the possible redemption of the perpetratorÕs 
psyche the only available avenue of redress enabled by this form? 
This article explores what kind of transformation or transition is 
possible within the terms of the filmÕs own (en)framing and the wider historico-
political context that it inhabits. The Act of Killing takes up a different and more 
subjective task of documentation than the field of transitional justiceÕs 
traditional orientation toward a polity, and in this sense the filmÕs objectives 
diverge considerably from those of the field.
10
 Yet transitional mechanisms also 
employ the affective categories of trauma and healing, and in this sense I 
suggest that both the film and certain discourses of transitional justice share a 
common sentiment. At the level of the individual subjectÑwhether victim, 
perpetrator, or beneficiary of past oppressionÑÒtransitologyÓ appears to slide 
into the realm of the therapeutic, and the imperative of overcoming trauma 
takes precedence over attention to structural injustice. As Didier Fassin and 




 Simon Critchley, Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance 
(London: Verso, 2008), 3. 
9
 Ibid., 38. 
10
 On transitional justice as a field, see Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000) and Pierre Hazan, Judging War, Judging History: Behind Truth and 
Reconciliation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). 
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Richard Rechtman have noted, the category of trauma has become a dominant 
form of representing historical violence: 
Trauma has become a major signifier of our age. It is our normal 
means of relating present suffering to past violence. It is the scar 
that a tragic event leaves on an individual victim or on a 
witnessÑsometimes even on a perpetrator.
11
 
Oppenheimer explains that he Òlingered on Anwar because his pain was close 
to the surfaceÓÑÒit was though he was shadowed by genuine memories that 
were haunting him.Ó
12
 Indeed, as the next section argues, The Act of Killing 
seems to present the production of the film itself as a therapeutic processÑan 
uneasy narrative of coming to terms with past acts. Yet unlike the frame of a 
truth and reconciliation commission, which allows a space for the figure of the 
perpetrator but with attendant conditions (solemnity at a minimum, and in some 
cases an intersubjective expression of remorse), the frame of the film appears 
unconditional: here perpetrators participate in producing a spectacle without the 
expectation that they ought to account for what they have done. 
In this sense, traumaÑAnwarÕs pain and the memories that haunt himÑ
forms a greater part of the filmÕs narrative arc than the issue of ongoing 
structural injustice and impunity. The filmÕs relation to the theme of 
accountability is less direct and more allegorical, read through the shattered 
psyche of its main perpetrator-protagonist. Oppenheimer claims he was Ònot 
interested in leading a killer to remorse. But É discovering his brokenness has 
been the most effective expos, if you like, of the rottenness of the whole 
regime.Ó
13
 This expos suggests a kind of metonymical relationship, where 
AnwarÕs broken psyche is seen to index the political order in contemporary 
Indonesia. The risk with this emphasis on the personal journey lies in 
foregrounding the psyche over the polis, and with privileging affective 
sentiments concerning the individual over political transformation. As a critical 
intervention, the filmÕs main purchase comes from what it allows us to see 
                                                
11
 Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman, The Empire of Trauma: An Inquiry into the Condition 
of Victimhood (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), xi. Cathy Caruth argues that ÒThe 
phenomenon of trauma seems to have become all-inclusive, but it has done so precisely because 
it brings us to the limits of our understanding: if psychoanalysis, psychiatry, sociology, and 
even literature are beginning to hear each other anew in the study of trauma, it is because they 
are listening through the radical disruption and gaps of traumatic experience.Ó Trauma: 
Explorations in Memory (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 4. 
12
 SOHK.TV Interview. 
13
 Joshua OppenheimerÕs interview with Amy Goodman, ÒDemocracy Now,Ó available at 
http://www.democracynow.org/2013/7/19/the_act_of_killing_new_film. 
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about the broader structural conditions of contemporary Indonesia than about 
AnwarÕs intrasubjective journey. 
This reading of The Act of Killing thus draws upon critiques of 
transitional justice, humanitarian discourse, and human rights. These critiques 
often employ a shared concern with how these discourses depoliticize and 
moralize, focusing on individual sentiments rather than structures of power. As 
Bronwyn Leebaw claims, transitional justice processes Òare too often framed as 
apolitical responses to the deeds and experiences of individual victims and 
perpetrators.Ó
14
 By contrast, thinking through transition at the broader level of 
the polity reveals the (political) dynamics between victims, perpetrators, and 
beneficiaries, as well as the structural conditions that continue to inform the 
way this violent history is disavowed in contemporary Indonesia. 
 
II. The Theatricality of Evil 
In 1965, the Indonesian government was overthrown by the 
military. Anybody opposed to the military dictatorship could be 
accused of being a communist: union members, landless 
farmers, intellectuals, and the ethnic Chinese. In less than a year, 
and with the direct aid of western governments, over one million 
ÒcommunistsÓ were murdered. The army used paramilitaries and 
gangsters to carry out the killings. These men have been in 
powerÑand have persecuted their opponentsÑever since. When 
we met the killers, they proudly told us stories about what they 
did. To understand why, we asked them to create scenes about 
the killings in whatever way they wished. This film follows that 
process, and documents its consequences. 
If The Act of Killing can be considered a documentary, its subject is not this 
violent period of Indonesian history in the mid-1960s. Little historical framing 
is provided beyond what appears in the text above, which accompanies the 
filmÕs opening moments. Much of the work of situating and contextualizing its 
content is left to the viewer.
15
 As a documentary, then, this filmÕs subject is the 
theatrical representation of violence by select individuals who participated in it. 
                                                
14
 Bronwyn Leebaw, Judging State-sponsored Violence, Imagining Political Change (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 92. 
15
 A good companion piece or supplement in this regard is Benedict AndersonÕs chapter in an 
edited volume assembled by Oppenheimer and a co-editor, which documents the September 
30
th
 movement and places the violence in political context. See Benedict Anderson, ÒImpunity,Ó 
in Brink and Oppenheimer (eds.), Killer Images, 268Ð286. 
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These perpetrator-protagonists present their past enemies as ÒcommunistsÓ and 
ÒChinese,Ó but apart from the claim above that killings were carried out Òwith 
the direct aid of western governments,Ó the larger Cold War history in which 
these acts transpired remains outside the frame.
16
 The Indonesian stateÕs 
counter-revolutionary suppression of its pre-1965 revolutionary past also does 
not feature in the narrative.
17
 The film thus does not engage in what Mahmood 
Mamdani would call Òthe question of political identityÓ resulting from Òthe 
history of state formation,Ó
18
 which would entail a more complex presentation 
of the colonial and post-colonial history of Indonesia as well as its broader 
geopolitical context. Instead, the filmÕs cursory introduction above mainly 
foregrounds the fact that the perpetrators were never removed from power, and 
it claims that their violent acts have been mythologized as heroic and necessary. 
The text above forms the largest part of its meta-narrative, where its 
makers inform their audience about the filmÕs context and their intentions in 
producing it. Its closing credits produce another archive: the overwhelming 
anonymity of its Indonesian crew, including one of the co-directors, marking 
the repressive political circumstances in which the film was made. The 
production of the film entailed great risks for them, and their participation was 
a courageous act of parrhesiaÑof speaking truth to the contemporary 
Indonesian state.
19
 But much of the broader context of The Act of Killing has 
come out primarily through interviews with its makers rather than within the 
film itself.
20
 The film is not an isolated text that stands alone as an interpretive 
object, but instead can be read alongside the commentary that its makers 
provide. This interpretive decision is a consequence of the film opening a 
number of ethical questions about its production that remain unanswered within 
The Act of Killing. The makers of the film have elaborated upon these questions 
extensively in press accounts and interviews. In these interviews, however, the 
emphasis appears to be as much about the experience of making the film within 
a film from the standpoint of its perpetrator-protagonists as it is about the 
                                                
16
 For more detailed historical accounts of this period, see the texts mentioned in supra note 2. 
17
 See Max Lane, Unfinished Nation: Indonesia Before and After Suharto (London: Verso, 
2008). 
18
 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the 
Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 21 and 22. 
19
 Michel Foucault, Fearless Speech (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2001). 
20
 A historian of Indonesia has criticized the film for decontextualizing these acts of killing, 
presenting them as Òthe work of civilian criminal psychopathsÓ rather than exploring the role of 
the Indonesian army. See Robert Cribb, ÒReview: An Act of Manipulation?,Ó Inside Indonesia 
112 (AprilÐJune 2013), available at http://www.insideindonesia.org/feature-editions/review-an-
act-of-manipulation. 
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broader Indonesian political context. For example, Joshua Oppenheimer 
describes the film as follows: 
The Act of Killing is a film in which former death squad leaders 
who have been in power ever since they helped the army of 
Indonesia kill a million people in 1965 are invited to dramatize 
what they have done as a way of understanding what happens to 
all of us when we build our normality on the basis of terror and 
lies. And these men set about re-enacting their acts of genocide, 
acts of mass murder, in dramatizations inspired by the film 
genres that they loveÑgangster, musical, cowboy, WesternÑ
and along the way they, the main characters in the film, go 
through an emotional journey where they start to understandÑ
the film-making process becomes the prism through which they 
finally recognize the true meaning of what they have done.
21
 
This extract from an interview is exemplary both for its discussion of formÑ
the role of film and specific genresÑas well as for expressing the sentiment 
that I have described as Òtransitology.Ó Here the perpetrator-protagonists are 
seen as undertaking Òan emotional journeyÓ where they move from a state of 
disavowal, repression or displacement to recognition of their past deeds. For 
this reason, the film can be read not only as a work of art but also as a 
narrative of redemption crafted by its filmmakers that links it thematically to 
the field of transitional justice. 
With nearly a decade spent acquiring footage, the normative arc of The 
Act of Killing comes in how it is edited and crafted as the narrative described 
by Oppenheimer above. In his many public interviews, Oppenheimer explains 
that he had been living in a community of survivors of the mid-1960s violence, 
and that there was limited space for recounting their stories in light of the 
political conditions in contemporary Indonesia. Instead they advised him to 
speak to those responsible for their suffering, and Oppenheimer found that the 





 SOHK.TV Interview. 
22
 At the filmÕs first large public screening in September 2012, Oppenheimer explains that he 
had previously been commissioned to make a film of survivor communities who were working 
on a plantation in Northern Sumatra. He found that their inability to mobilize to contest their 
working conditions was tied to the ongoing fear of perpetrators living in their midst, and he was 
advised to speak with the perpetrators. Introduction to The Act of Killing with Joshua 
Oppenheimer at the Toronto International Film Festival, September 9, 2012, available at 
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The resulting film is thus based upon the narratives of the perpetrators. 
These men Òhad a natural theatricality É which led [Oppenheimer] to offer to 
underwrite and film their re-enactments of their deeds.Ó
23
 The filmÕs audience 
is introduced to ÒAnwar Congo: Executioner in 1965,Ó who demonstrates how 
he dispensed with suspected communists on a rooftop in Medan, Northern 
Sumatra. He explains that he adapted wire-based strangulation in order to 
minimize the bloodiness of his acts of killing. The broad smile on AnwarÕs 
face as he stands poised with the wire around the neck of another man, also 
smiling, is unsettling enough: this is compounded when moments later he 
begins to dance and claims that ÒIÕve tried to forget all this with good musicÉ. 
DancingÉ.Ó AnwarÕs modes of escape provide a red thread throughout the 
film, as do his claims that he is haunted by victims of these acts who come to 
him in nightmares. The other perpetrator-protagonists appear less emotionally 
developed within the frame of the film: Herman Koto, AnwarÕs main sidekick, 
seems to be liberated from such haunting and instead delights in the subversive 
position afforded by the filmÕs production. KotoÕs most memorable scenes 
involve him dressing in drag: as the violated woman in a Western-style wagon 
train scene; as a vengeful goddess who delights in eating AnwarÕs organs; and 
as an ambiguous figure clad in body-fitting pink lycra, accentuating KotoÕs 
corpulent form. Indeed, KotoÕs interventions as a character in The Act of 
Killing serve more as theatrical depictions of a much-admired Hollywood than 
as registering the Òemotional journeyÓ that Oppenheimer describes. 
The men involved in staging this film within a film have associations 
with the Pancasila Youth, a paramilitary organization with connections to the 
Indonesian state. Emerging from out of the period of SuhartoÕs ascendance to 
power, the organization was rooted in the activities of paramilitary ÒgangstersÓ 
who supported the overthrow of SukarnoÕs government and the attendant purge 
of suspected communists. The perpetrator-protagonists in The Act of Killing 
frequently refer to themselves as Ògangsters,Ó asserting a link between 
ÒgangsterÓ and Òfree manÓ as if the terms were locked together through a 
shared etymology. The ÒgangsterÓ presented here is unlike the 1960s Jamaican 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NU-8Xv-LVUk. See also OppenheimerÕs interview with 
ÒDemocracy Now.Ó 
23
 ÒThe killers did not get a salary but were paid what Mr. Oppenheimer called a Ômodest per 
diemÕ (approved by the University of Westminster and the British Arts and Humanities 
Research Council, which financed the re-enactments).Ó Larry Rother, ÒA MovieÕs Killers are 
All Too Real: ÔThe Act of KillingÕ and Indonesian Death Squads,Ó New York Times, July 12, 
2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/movies/the-act-of-killing-and-
indonesian-death-squads.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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Òrude boy,Ó however, whose transgressive self-fashioning has been read as a 
practice of freedom.
24
 Instead, the Indonesian ÒgangsterÓ presented in the film 
reads as a morally unencumbered subject, radically libertarian, whose 
ÒfreedomÓ appears more as a negative freedom rather than as a practice of 
identity. 7hese self-proclaimed Òfree menÓ are still imbricated with state 
power: they participated in counterrevolutionary violence that displaced the 
previous post-colonial order. The filmÕs overlaid text tells us ÒPancasila 
Youth is one of IndonesiaÕs biggest paramilitary organizations. Pancasila 
Youth played a leading role in the 1965Ð66 killings.Ó In a political speech 
captured by the filmmakers, the organizationÕs leader, Yapto 
Soerjosoemarno, states: 
All members of the Pancasila Youth are heroes. From 
exterminating the communists to fighting neo-communists and 
left-wing extremists and those wishing to break apart the nation. 
This isnÕt only the duty of the army and police. We, Pancasila 
Youth, must take a stand. For these are threats to the nation and 
we must take action. 
Despite claims to libertarian subjectivity, the gangster is carrying out the work 
of the state by proxy. The gangster appears as a persona who kills without 
remorse, but precisely because he is carrying out this work for others. 
Oppenheimer notes that sometimes Anwar and his friends would use a state 
television crew Òsince they are basically the government in Northern 
Sumatra.Ó
25
 Although the protagonists cultivate a mythology of their own 
libertarian form of freedom, they are still bound up in the state apparatus of 
contemporary Indonesia, raising questions regarding the extent to which the 
filmmakers may also be interpellated into this framework of power despite 
their attempts to unravel it. As with other subversive documentary works, such 
as Mads BrggerÕs films The Red Chapel (2009) and The Ambassador (2011), 
there are uncomfortable moments for both filmmaker and audience as access is 
negotiated through acts or omissions that inhabit a grey zone between 
documentation and complicity.
26
 Yet by dwelling in this ambiguous zone, the 
24
 David Scott, ÒFanonian Futures,Ó in Refashioning Futures: Criticism after Postcoloniality 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
25
 Q&A with Joshua Oppenheimer at the Toronto International Film Festival, September 9, 
2012, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NU-8Xv-LVUk. 
26
 Oppenheimer claims that he began the project Òwith a sense of mission for the survivors, but 
at the same time, I also wanted to know how my characters, as human beings, imagined 
themselves. Therefore, I had no choice but to treat them like human beings if I expected them to 
allow me to see the human beings they really are from the very beginning of the filming. That 
was the gauntlet I threw down before myself. And then at a certain point, Anwar and I started to 
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film also archives the limits of what forms of documentation are possible in 
light of the heroic status still accorded to these perpetrators in contemporary 
Indonesia as well as their links to state power. 
The representation of violenceÑand particularly of state and state-
sanctioned violenceÑis constrained by social and political factors. In her work 
on the images of torture taken at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, Judith Butler 
asks us to consider Òwhat forms of social and state power are ÔembeddedÕ in 
the frame.Ó
27
 ButlerÕs work concerns images from war reporting, and the 
subject is mediated through the photographerÕs lens and through the US stateÕs 
efforts to establish control over the framing, Òif always with only partial 
successÓ28 The Act of Killing harbours a double frame: there is the framing 
carried out by the perpetrators in their embellished re-enactments, who are 
themselves enframed by Oppenheimer when he shows Anwar casually 
dancing the cha-cha after his staged demonstration of killing by wire on the 
rooftop. Here we see quite clearly the Òframing of the frame,Ó
29
 in ButlerÕs 
words: a framing that is often constrained directly and indirectly by state 
power. Oppenheimer has made concessions to power that were arguably 
productive: among other things, through his decision to focus on perpetrators, 
which he claims resulted in part due to harassment and threats from state 
security services when he attempted to document victims.
30
 Another 
concession may have been the decision to give the perpetrators authorial 
control over the narratives they would tell. Although it led to fascinating 
insights into how these individuals see themselves and wish to be seen, the 
decision to let the filmÕs subjects recount their acts through the stylistic 
conventions of their choice raises questions about the ethics of this form of 
representation. Even so, the film also reveals what power has attempted to 
occlude, which is where its own subversive potential emerges. 
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Watching the film, then, there is the distinct sense of a divide between the 
period of its makingÑwhich may have entailed moments of complicity, or at 
least of the filmmaker bearing neutral witnessÑand the period of its 
dissemination, when its critical force can be brought to bear upon the powers 
that previously constrained its production. 
The film harbours a tension precisely because of its makersÕ careful 
efforts not to moralize or guide the perpetratorsÕ self-reflections while 
assembling the material that forms the finished product. Thus Anwar seems left 
to his own observations of himself, musing, ÒIÕd see the person being 
interrogated É I wouldnÕt be sadistic. IÕd give the guy a cigarette, IÕd still be 
dancing, laughing. It was like we were killing happily,Ó or noting ÒI know my 
bad dreams come from what I did, killing people who didnÕt want to die. I 
forced them to die.Ó There is no intersubjective space of judgment within the 
film, no sense of accountability to others, but rather the impression of an egoic 
journey with occasional moments of self-reflection. The journey transpires 
through the vehicle of artistic production, dwelling upon aesthetic details such 
as AnwarÕs comments, when viewing himself on film, that he would never 
have worn white back then on account of the bloodÑÒI look like IÕm dressed 
for a picnicÓÑor ÒMy acting has to be violent. And maybe I should dye my 
hair black.Ó Such seemingly trite and unrepentant observations, combined with 
the stylized spectacle of the re-enactments, leads to the aestheticization of 
violence as camp. As Susan Sontag wrote, the essence of camp is Òits love of 
the unnatural: of artifice and exaggerationÓÑa ÒsensibilityÓ that Òconverts the 
serious into the frivolous.Ó
31
 A scene of young women dancing before a 
waterfall while Anwar receives imagined blessings from his victims forms a 
particularly unsettling exampleÑa staged spectacle of redemption drawn 
entirely from the perpetratorsÕ own creativity and desire. 
One of the filmÕs main provocations is thus the ethical discomfort it 
may produce for its viewers in witnessing this conversion of serious materialÑ
acts that could constitute crimes against humanity in the framework of 
international lawÑinto campy visual spectacles when viewed as a work of art. 
As a documentary, the filmÕs subject is the creation of the film within it, with 
the latter inhabiting an ambivalent space between fiction and nonfiction; 
Oppenheimer himself refers to it as Ònonfiction filmmaking.Ó
32
 The inner film 
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characters the moment you film them. You are never a passive observer documenting ÔwhatÕs 
there.Õ ThatÕs why itÕs fundamentally creative.Ó OppenheimerÕs interview with Pamela Cohn, 
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depicts events that occurred, but mediated through creative retellings that re-
contextualize these acts through the use of different settings, props, and 
costuming, and drawing upon the tropes of Hollywood film genres. Theorizing 
the ethics of viewing in this case thus requires drawing upon work that 
considers the representation of both actual and fictionalized violence. 
The ethical questions prompted by The Act of Killing have been 
addressed in other attempts to think through how acts of violence are 
represented through different media, including photography and journalism. 
Several scholars have noted how certain representations operate as a kind of 
Òpornography of violence,Ó which Judith Butler describes as Òthe pleasure 
taken in seeing human degradation and in the eroticization of that 
degradationÓÑa Òsexualization of the act of seeingÓ distinct from the depiction 
of sexual acts.
33
 Mahmood Mamdani has claimed that Ò[n]ewspaper writing on 
Darfur has sketched a pornography of violence.É This voyeuristic approach 
accompanies a moralistic discourse whose effect is both to obscure the politics 
of the violence and position the reader as a virtuous, not just a concerned 
observer.Ó
34
 In both instances, the critique concerns the relation between the 
spectator and the representation, a gaze that is construed as pornographic due 
to the affect of the viewer contrasted with the gravity of what is represented. 
Relatedly, Arthur Kleinman has argued that Òcommercialized voyeurismÓ may 
lead to the loss of empathy as suffering is increasingly rendered visible in 
commercial and consumable forms.
35
 Among the effects pointed out by these 
commentators are the derivation of pleasure from suffering, the depoliticization 
of violence, moralistic spectatorship, and the loss of empathy. 
While Butler, Mamdani, and Kleinman are speaking here of the 
potential effects of ÒpornographicÓ or ÒvoyeuristicÓ documentation of violent 
acts and suffering, others have thought through the ethical dilemmas attending 
fictional representations of violence in literature and film, where they note 
tensions between the seductive pleasure of an aesthetic form and its troubling 
content. Concerning the political effects of ConradÕs Heart of Darkness, 
Michael Taussig writes, 
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I am not so sure that its strikingly literary quality and 
hallucinatory filminess do not finally blind and stun the reader 
into a trance, drowning in a sea-storm of imagery. The danger 
here lies with aestheticizing horror, and while Conrad stops 
short of doing that, we must realize that just to the side lurks the 
seductive poetics of fascism and the imaginative source of terror 
and torture embedded deep within us all.
 36
 
In her work on violent films, criminologist Alison Young asks how we might 
judge the affect of cinematic violence. This approach foregrounds the figure of 
the filmÕs viewer, who is put in a Òthoroughly equivocal positionÓ of deriving 
pleasure from both judging violence as well as from the aesthetics of the scene 
in which violence is carried out.
37
 Writing about a torture scene in Quentin 
TarantinoÕs film Reservoir Dogs (1992), Young notes Òthe spectator is placed 
in a thoroughly compromised ethical position, experiencing both pleasure in 
the look of the scene and of the character, and distaste for the violence that will 
ensue.Ó
38
 A film critic commenting on The Act of Killing hints at this ethical 
dilemma when she remarks ÒitÕs important to emphasize, I think, how funÑin 
a horrible wayÑthis really is to watch.Ó
39
 
The difference is in what is being depicted: in the first instance a 
fictional account of torture, and in the second, theatrical representations of past 
acts, which is what leaves the violent scenes in The Act of KillingÑthough not 
the historical acts they depictÑsomewhere between Abu Ghraib and Reservoir 
Dogs. Anwar seizes upon this ambiguity between documentation and aesthetic 
representation when he observes, 
Why do people watch films about Nazis? To see power and 
sadism. We can do that. We can make something even more 
sadistic than É more sadistic than what you see in movies about 
Nazis. Sure I can! Because thereÕs never been a movie where 
heads get chopped off except in fiction, but thatÕs different 
because I did it in real life! 
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 Catherine Shoard on The Guardian Film Show, June 28, 2013, available at 
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In addition to the ethical dilemmas it presents to its viewers, part of the 
interpretive challenge of viewing The Act of Killing lies in understanding the 
referent of these scenes. Do they represent historical acts or rather the 
memories of individual deeds, distorted and embellished over time, an 
amalgamation of reality and fiction? Projections of sadism refigured as 
heroism? Outside the structuring frame of a truth commission, with its 
testimony taken under oath, there is no external constraint upon these 
representations apart from the material constraints of the filmic form. The 
makers of the film within the film, these perpetrator-protagonists, are free to set 
the terms of the frame and its truth conditions. Oppenheimer maintains in an 
interview that Òeverything we see is nonfictionÓ and Òeverything is true,Ó but 
this ÒtruthÓ is mediated Òthrough artifacts, through emotional and poetic force, 
through [AnwarÕs] personal process.Ó
40
 Elsewhere in a scholarly piece on a 
related project, Oppenheimer and a co-author claim that Òwe avoid considering 
historical narration as mediation of a past that can be made coherently and fully 




What kind of archive might this be, then, in registering events from 
IndonesiaÕs violent history? For Oppenheimer and his co-directors, it would 
seem that the film documents a certain transformation within its subjects. To 
return to OppenheimerÕs comment, Òthe filmmaking process becomes the prism 
through which they finally recognize the meaning of what they have done.Ó I 
want to suggest here that such a reading is overly restrictive, foregrounding the 
psychic dimensions of a largely intrasubjective process to the detriment of a 
series of other important relationships. There is the relationship between The 
Act of Killing and its makers, which raises issues of complicity, interpellation, 
and framing. There is the relation between the film and its audience, raising 
issues about the ethics of viewing: the risks of aestheticizing violence as camp, 
the (pornographic) pleasure and jouissance of spectatorship, and ethical 
disorientation.
42
 Finally, there is the relationship between the filmÕs subjects 
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and the broader socio-political context to which they belong. This relationship 
highlights the psyche/polis dichotomy that the film arguably resolves in favour 
of the psyche. 
 
III. ÒTransitologyÓ and Humanitarian Reason 
The boundaries between Anwar as a person and the political 
regime have been dissolved. HeÕs holding it all. I could not have 




There has been no public accounting for the violence that occurred in Indonesia 
during the mid-1960s. Because of the ongoing relationship between 
perpetrators and the Indonesian state, Oppenheimer and his co-directors turned 
to inventive forms to produce narratives of that period. As an archive of 
historical violence, the film captures subjective impressions of past acts, 
mediated through decades of remembering, repressing, and embellishing, and 
supplemented by campy costumes and sets in its contemporary re-telling. 
Reading this film as a work of artÑwhether documentary, creative nonfiction, 
or even as fantasyÑleads to the ethical questions posed above concerning its 
production and uptake by its audience. But the filmÕs intervention is not only as 
a work of art. Its makers see it as prompting a transition within its subjects, and 
more broadly, as acting into Indonesian society to reveal what has been 
repressed. As noted previously, one commentator claimed that the film 
Òpenetrates the entrenched impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators.Ó
44
 These 
understandings of the filmÑas a site of reckoning and accountabilityÑbring it 
into a relationship with what I have been referring to as Òtransitology,Ó or the 
ideological sentiments of transitional justice.
45
 
The Act of Killing raises what political theorist Robert Meister calls the 
Òquestions of impunity and disclosureÓ that accompany the transitional justice 
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literature on trials and truth commissions.
46
 Individual criminal accountability 
and truth-telling are among the ideological underpinnings of the field of 
transitional justice. These sentiments appear both within the film itself and in 
interviews with its makers. One bridge between this internal narrative and 
external commentary lies in a rare appearance of Oppenheimer within the 
frame of the film. The filmmaker prompts the paramilitary perpetrator Adi 
Zulkadry, who has thus far appeared unapologetic, to reflect upon his own acts 
in the language of criminal accountability. From behind the camera, 
Oppenheimer asks, ÒI donÕt mean to make you uncomfortable, but I have to 
askÉ. By telling yourself it was Òwar,Ó youÕre not haunted like Anwar. But the 
Geneva Conventions would define what you did as a Ôwar crime.ÕÓ Zulkadry 
explains why he does not agree Òwith the international courts,Ó interpreting law 
or right as a product of those in powerÑÒwhen Bush was in power, 
Guantanamo was rightÓÑand concluding that, as Òa winner,Ó he was able to 
define war crimes for himself. Oppenheimer presses further: ÒWhat if you were 
brought to the international criminal court in The Hague?Ó Zulkadry responds 
defiantly: ÒIÕd go! I donÕt feel guiltyÉ. Please, get me called to The Hague!Ó 
In practice the Hague court could not exercise jurisdiction over ZulkadryÕs 
acts, but OppenheimerÕs remarks appear to be aimed at prompting the 
unreconciled perpetrator to think in terms of his individual criminal 
accountability. 
In addition to prompting his subject to considering his violent acts as 
crimes, Oppenheimer also presses him to think about the importance of 
establishing a historical record. In response to ZulkadryÕs claim that Òeven if 
everything youÕre finding out is absolutely true, itÕs not good,Ó Oppenheimer 
counters, Òbut for the millions of families whose relative were killed, if the 
truth comes out, itÕs good.Ó OppenheimerÕs claim about the moral value of 
truth for those directly affected by violence reveals an underlying premise of 
truth commissions: that establishing a historical record of what transpired is a 
collectively therapeutic exercise. But what if the narrative of the perpetrators is 
insufficiently remorseful or even defiant? Antje Krog recounts the desire of the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation CommissionÕs audience to hear from 
apartheid-era perpetrators after months of victimsÕ accounts: ÒMore and more, 
we want the second narrative. And it had better be good. It had better be 
powerful. It had better display integrity. And it had better bring acute personal 
detail, grief, and bewilderment.Ó
47
 Yet as Krog goes on to recount, many of the 
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apartheid-era perpetrators who appeared before the commission did not speak 
in the repentant tone that the audience desired. Similarly, the anonymous 
Indonesian co-director of The Act of Killing commented: 
How could these people tell these horrible stories so lightly and 
so proudly? You just want to challenge them right away. But 
you have to keep telling yourself to be patient, to let them tell 
the story the way they like. Because then we can learn 
something about the whole system of destruction.
48
 
In the event that the speakers do not perform the desired integrity, grief, and 
bewilderment and instead speak with levity and pride, their speech acts become 
a matter of establishing content for the historical record rather than attempts to 
repent or reconcile. In this sense the film has aspects of the work of a truth 
commission, of documenting Òsomething about the whole system of 
destruction.Ó It may be that, in OppenheimerÕs words, Òsomething true is 
revealed through this process,Ó
49
 yet this ÒtruthÓ is mediated through many 
layers of representation and artifice. Meanwhile, the therapeutic dimension is 
foreclosed to the audience of the speech act and is reserved for the perpetrators 
alone. 
The filmmakersÕ emphasis on accountability and truth-telling appears to 
be supplanted by a deeper investment in the psychological journey of the filmÕs 
subjects. This privileges an intrasubjective focus on the psyche of the 
perpetrator-protagonists over an intersubjective frame, whether accountability 
to others or establishing the truth for others. Two key scenes arguably offer 
different conclusions to The Act of Killing, both of which are revealing for this 
emphasis on the insular sentiments of the perpetrator. The first scene, which 
also appears briefly in the opening, is a staged scene of redemption. Young 
women dance to ÒBorn FreeÓ in front of a waterfall, encircling Anwar, clad in 
black, and Herman, in a vivid blue dress. Two men approach Anwar and 
remove garrotting wire from around their necks. One pulls a medal out of his 
pocket, drapes it over AnwarÕs neck, shakes his hand, and states: Òfor 
executing me and sending me to heavenÉ. I thank you a thousand times, for 
everything.Ó The men then join hands with Anwar and Herman and raise their 
arms skyward. This scene contrasts sharply with the final sequence of the film, 
wherein Anwar returns to the darkened rooftop of the building where he had 
previously demonstrated how he executed people by garrotting. In contrast to 
his previous theatrics, this time Anwar is restless and troubled. 
48
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ÒThis is where we tortured and killed the people we captured,Ó he explains, 
adding ÒI know it was wrongÑbut I had to do it.Ó His breathing becomes more 
laboured and his body begins to shudder, and he retches violently. The scene 
drags on, with the camera lingering on the figure of Anwar retching, suspended 
at this threshold of abjection. 
The two scenes suggest different moral conclusions for the perpetrators 
themselves. In the first we witness a staged spectacle of reconciliation and 
redemption, where the perpetrators have appropriated the voices of dead 
victims for their own egoic purposes. Yet what is depicted is a kind of 
inoperative reconciliation. The perpetrator constructs his own fantasy 
projection of forgiving victims; there is no intersubjective encounter, but rather 
a relation of self to self mediated by the psychic projection of an imagined 
other. By contrast, in the second scene we see how Anwar is unable to purge 
himself of his hauntingsÑthe resolution or climax does not arrive, and he 
remains in a liminal state of apparent suffering. There is no catharsis to be had 
on the rooftop site where he committed his acts of killing. 
In both instances, then, these scenes heavily emphasize the psychic 
desires or suffering of the perpetrators. The filmÕs focus on their affect and 
sentiments is a symptom of what anthropologist Didier Fassin describes as 
Òhumanitarian reasonÓ: a moral economy where Ò[i]nequality is replaced by 
exclusion, domination is transformed into misfortune, injustice is articulated as 
suffering, violence is expressed in terms of trauma.Ó
50
 In this economy, the 
second (moralistic) term is privileged over the first (political) term, and the 
language of suffering and trauma displaces the language of injustice and 
violence. Fassin argues that there is a corresponding epistemological shift 
among those who document violence and injustice, who are now Òmore 
sensitive to the subjectivity of agents and to the experience of pain and 
affliction.Ó
51
 Fassin illustrates how recourse to the concept of trauma makes it 
possible to expand the range of individuals who may be considered victimsÑ




Political theorists have noted the central role afforded to trauma and 
suffering in contemporary discourses of human rights and transitional justice. 
Wendy Brown claims that human rights Òtake their shape as a moral discourse 
centered on pain and suffering rather than a political discourse of 
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 Robert Meister extends this critique of the apolitical 
moralism of contemporary human rights discourse by considering how it 
presents the relationships between different political subjectivities, whether 
perpetrators, victims, or conformists (bystanders to or beneficiaries of past 
regimes).
54
 For Meister, the aspiration of human rights discourse Òis that 
victims of past evil will not struggle against its ongoing beneficiaries after the 
evildoers are gone.Ó
55
 The project of human rights transforms a politics of 
struggle and popular resistance into an ethics of reconciliation, Òwith its 
ostensibly less political focus on compassion for bodies in pain.Ó
56
 What this 
means politically in transitional societies such as South Africa, Meister argues, 
is that invoking past or ongoing grievancesÑsuch as the gains that 
beneficiaries of past violence continue to enjoy in the presentÑdisrupts the 
collective agreement that ÒevilÓ has passed. 
In the vision of Indonesia represented through the film, the widely 
acknowledged ÒevilÓ appears to be the spectral threat of an imagined 
ÒcommunismÓ rather than the historical violence of the anti-communist purge 
in which Anwar and his supporters participated. There is no collective 
agreement that the events of 1965Ð66 require some form of reconciliation; 
indeed, as The Act of Killing points out, these acts continue to be publicly 
celebrated.
57
 Unlike South Africa, then, Indonesia is not a transitional society, 
yet MeisterÕs critique offers a vocabulary for understanding the complex 
political subjectivity of the filmÕs main characters in addition to illustrating the 
shortcomings of Òhumanitarian compassion.Ó The subjectivity of the filmÕs 
protagonists is multiple: they are perpetrators as well as ongoing beneficiaries 
of past violence, enjoying the gains brought through their connections to the 
Pancasila Youth and, by extension, to the Indonesian state. OppenheimerÕs 
interviews suggest an additional identity: they are also represented as 
traumatized subjects through their participation in these acts of killing. 
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 In a ÒSpecial DialogueÓ on Indonesian National Television presented in the film, the showÕs 
smiling host announces that ÒAnwar and his friends developed a new, more efficient system for 
exterminating communists, a system more humane, less sadistic, and without excessive 
violence É but you also just wiped them out!Ó to an applauding audience clad in Pancasila 
Youth uniforms.  
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Robert Meister is concerned with the political significance of 
intersubjective identification in contemporary human rights discourse and 
transitional justice. A key relationship is the beneficiaryÕs identification with 
the (idealized and reconciled) victim as a mutual survivor of past violence, 
which serves to reassure the beneficiary that the (potentially unreconciled and 
aggrieved) victim will not demand compensation. In this way, Meister writes, 
Òhumanitarian compassion defends against the beneficiaryÕs anxietiesÓ through 
the beneficiaryÕs identification with the reconciled victim.
58
 Through a 
psychoanalytic reading, Meister shows how the self may be split in ways that 
project and incorporate other identities. The hostility a beneficiary would feel 
toward an external victim (who, if unreconciled, may appear as a threat) is 
instead directed toward an internalized victim. The suffering that the 
beneficiary may have wished upon another (or did not prevent from happening) 
becomes the beneficiaryÕs own loss. The resulting melancholia of the 
beneficiary is a product of feeling an Òongoing and irreparableÓ loss that has 
been internalized: the beneficiary feels bad, Òbut in a good way, because he 
suffers as though he were someone else.Ó59 FreudÕs psychoanalytic account of 
melancholia is centered on the melancholic patient. By contrast, Meister is 
concerned with the political effects of beneficiaries producing an inner victim: 
Identifying with and as the victim of the loss represses and 
perpetuates that patientÕs ambivalence about being, rather, a 
perpetrator or beneficiary. But the object of those negative 
feelings is nothing outside the beneficiaryÕs unconscious mind. 
So we are not asked to consider whose primary loss the 
melancholic internalizes as his own loss or how this might affect 
ongoing relations with the real (external) loser.
60
 
For Meister, these forms of psychic identification foreground the feelings of 
the ÒwinnersÓÑperpetrators and beneficiariesÑrather than actual (socio-
political) relations between those who benefited from past injustice and those 
who suffered. In humanitarian discourse, Meister argues, this helps to explain 
how compassion is a privileged affect: with compassion, melancholic feelings 
are transformed into pity for the Òvictimary objectÓ that the beneficiary also 
identifies with and internalizes. But because this (internal) victim is a 
projection rather than an actual, aggrieved individual, such compassion is 
remarkably tenuous and can easily regress to paranoia when the external victim 
is encountered. The political effect of this form of humanitarian compassion is 
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to transform the beneficiary into a bystander, a witness to suffering, but a 
suffering that is still oriented toward preserving the psychic comfort of the 
beneficiary: ÒThe compassionate bystander is no longer a beneficiary who has 
a victim; rather, he is the witness that his imaginary victim wants.Ó
61
 What 
Fassin identifies as the logic of Òhumanitarian reasonÓ features heavily in 
MeisterÕs diagnosis of Òhumanitarian compassion,Ó where injustice is recast as 
suffering and bearing witness is taken to be a political act. Meister writes, 
humanitarian compassion defends against the beneficiaryÕs 
anxieties by constructing him as a viewer who can choose to 
insert himself into the picture viewed. Twenty-first-century 
humanitarianism calls the beneficiary a bystander in order to 
recall him as a witness who will no longer look away from those 
who still suffer. The new, affective bond to be created between 
them is made possible by an act of memory that makes 
compassion in the present discontinuous with the past.62 
MeisterÕs overarching concern is with the ways in which contemporary 
humanitarian discourse (including the language of human rights and 
transitional justice) forecloses the possibility of justice in the present by 
reconstituting these different political identitiesÑperpetrators, victims, and 
collaboratorsÑas survivors of past injustice united through a shared ethos of 
reconciliation. The moral economy of affect, identification, and empathy 
displaces a political analysis of enduring power imbalances and ongoing 
injustice. 
I draw upon MeisterÕs critique of humanitarian discourse because it 
helps to diagnose some of the presumptions of The Act of KillingÕs approach to 
historical injustice. The film documents remorseless perpetrators and boastful 
paramilitaries, but it also archives the trauma of AnwarÕs psyche. Toward the 
end of the film, the perpetrators stage a noir-style scene where Anwar plays a 
communist victim of a garrotting and Herman plays his interrogator. With a 
blindfold over his eyes and Herman tugging at a wire around his neck, Anwar 
becomes visibly disturbed and his hand begins to shake. Herman stops and asks 
if Anwar can continue, and Anwar responds, ÒNo. I canÕt do that again.Ó Later, 
after Oppenheimer shows Anwar the waterfall scene, or what the filmmaker 
has referred to in an interview as ÒAnwarÕs vision of redemption,Ó
63
 he asks to 
view the scene where he is strangled. He calls his young grandsons into the 
room to view it with him, instructing them to Òwatch the scene where grandpa 
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is tortured and killed.Ó After his grandsons leave, Anwar addresses the 
filmmaker (offscreen): 
Anwar Congo: Did the people I tortured feel the way I do here? 
I can feel what the people I tortured felt. Because here my 
dignity has been destroyed É and then fear comes, right there 
and then. All the terror suddenly possessed my body. It 
surrounded me, and possessed me. 
Joshua Oppenheimer: Actually, the people you tortured felt far 
worseÑbecause you know itÕs only a film. They knew they 
were being killed. 
Anwar Congo: But I can feel it, Josh. Really, I feel it. Or have I 
sinned? I did this to so may people, Josh. Is it all coming back to 
me? I really hope it wonÕt. I donÕt want it to, Josh. 
Anwar claims to feel what his victims felt, asserting a kind of affective bond 
that suggests an effort to internalize the victim in the psychoanalytic 
framework described above. As not only a beneficiary of past violence but also 
as a direct participant in acts of killing, Anwar may have even more reason to 
internalize and thus ÒtameÓ the objects of his violence in an effort to overcome 
their persistent hauntings. When Oppenheimer contests this identification by 
invoking the actual victim, Anwar insists on this affective bondÑÒreally, I feel 
itÓÑand expresses the paranoia of the perpetrator who fears revenge. This 
scene contrasts starkly with AnwarÕs Òvision of redemptionÓ before the 
waterfall, where reconciled victims thank him for redeeming them (sending 
them to heaven), in turn redeeming him from his Òsin.Ó It is in this latter scene 
where Anwar seeks to incorporate the projected internal victim, reconstituting 
himself as a compassionate witness and attempting to instantiate a symbolic 
break from the past. In this sense the film within a film employs the 
transitological tropes of reconciliation and bearing witness. Indeed, 
Oppenheimer describes these scenes of AnwarÕs psychic struggles and hopes 
for redemption as something to which the filmmakers and the filmÕs audience 
should also bear witness: 
At some point, as Anwar started to go more and more into his 
conscience and into his nightmares, I felt, somehow, that I was a 
fellow traveler with him through all this, into all those dark 
places. But I had to keep my eyes open in order to allow him to 
go through all this and just be with him on that journey, as a 
support, certainly, but more importantly, as a witness. ThatÕs 
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how I felt more and more towards the end of making it and how 
one should feel towards the end of the movie.
64
 
Read in relation to MeisterÕs critique of Òhumanitarian compassion,Ó we can 
see how injustice is recast here as suffering, and bearing witness is taken to be 
a moral imperativeÑwe are hailed as well. The moral economy of affect, 
identification, and empathy displaces a political analysis of enduring power 
structures and ongoing injustice. Meister seeks to show how this logic 
forecloses the possibility of justice in the present by reconstituting these 
different political identitiesÑperpetrators, victims, and collaboratorsÑas 
survivors of past injustice through a shared ethos of reconciliation. 
This critique of transitological sentiments within The Act of Killing 
reveals the overdetermined presence of the psyche and the relative absence of 
the polis within the film. Meister argues that the Òmoral error of justice-as-
reconciliationÓ is Òto suggest that those who inflicted injury or benefited from 
it must focus on recovery and self-forgiveness.Ó65 Put another way, this Òmoral 
errorÓ entails privileging the intrasubjective. Yet there may be a more 
liberatory potential for the film that extends beyond this inward orientation. In 
The Emancipated Spectator, Jacques Rancire claims that the disorientation we 
feel as spectators of intolerable images multiplies Òfolds and gaps, connections 
and disconnectionsÓ that Òreframe relations between bodiesÓ and Òchange the 
cartography of the perceptible, the thinkable and the feasible.Ó
66
 Rancire 
suggests a different politics of the sensible based on the uncertainty of effects: 
The images of art do not supply weapons for battles. They help 
sketch new configurations of what can be seen, what can be said 
and what can be thought and, consequently, a new landscape of 
the possible. But they do so on condition that their meaning or 
effect is not anticipated.
67
 
The Act of KillingÕs internal morality tale is a product of the narrative arc that 
its directors inscribed within it. But while this article has argued that the filmÕs 
progressive potential is not to be found in its subjectsÕ intrasubjective journeys, 
its uptake is indeterminate: indeed, it appears to sketch Òa new landscape of the 
possible.Ó The film has been invoked as evidence of army-sponsored 
paramilitary participation in the killings by Indonesian human rights groups 
who are lobbying the government for a truth and reconciliation commission. As 
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an intervention, then, the filmÕs main purchase comes from what it allows us to 
see about the broader structural conditions of contemporary Indonesia, and its 
critical potential lies in what it reveals about what state power attempts to 
occlude. The film archives the relative absence of forms of accountability for 
historical violence in contemporary Indonesia, suggesting that a return to the 
polis and its intersubjective space of judgment may be possible despite the 
filmÕs overdetermination of the psyche. 
 
